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Traffic equilibrium between transit lines serviced by 
capacitated vehicles: a route choice model with 
passenger waiting on platform 
Fabien Leurent (1) 
Université Paris Est, Laboratoire Ville Mobilité Transport, Ecole des Ponts ParisTech 
Abstract 
A theory is provided for the problem of passenger waiting and route choice at a transit station 
where a set of lines serviced by vehicles of limited capacity are available to reach a given 
destination. It is assumed that the platform layout involves one boarding zone only. The 
theory addresses waiting discipline – either priority queuing or mingled waiting – and choice 
behaviour – either selfish or social. 
The problem of passenger traffic assignment to capacitated transit lines is modelled in a 
stationary framework, basically assuming memoryless services and passenger arrivals. The 
size of the passenger stock on the platform is the main state variable as it determines the 
attractivity condition of a line with respect to alternative routes. Traffic equilibrium is based 
on the attractivity of a line bundle; it is characterized as the solution to a recursive program. 
Its existence and uniqueness are demonstrated. When the stock size increases the attractive 
bundle is enlarged and its average cost is increased. An efficient solution algorithm is 
provided. The transition from traffic theory to network assignment is discussed. Lastly, a 
Markovian model of the traffic problem is developed; an analytical solution is given for the 
case of two lines of unit or infinite vehicle capacity. 
Keywords 
Transit vehicle capacity. Station platform. Passenger stock. Attractivity threshold. Priority 
queuing. Mingled waiting. Selfish behaviour. Social behaviour 
1. Introduction 
Background. A transit mode of transportation involves the boarding of passengers in service 
vehicles at station nodes, prior to carrying them aboard up to their alighting station. At a 
station platform, the passenger has to wait for a vehicle to arrive. When the stock of waiting 
passengers exceeds the capacity available in the vehicle, then some passengers have to wait 
further. Reducing the users’ waiting time is a stake of paramount importance to the network 
operator who strives to deliver a satisfactory quality of service. Two families of models are 
available to design service plans: first, ‘bulk’ models in queuing theory (e.g. Kleinrock, 1975) 
have some analytical properties of limited practical value; second, in traffic assignment theory 
a series of models have been developed to address passenger route choice onto a transit 
network, eventually considering capacity constraints. The dominant model for uncapacitated 
route choice at a station to a given destination is due to Chriqui and Robillard (1975): it has 
been generalized to network assignment by Spiess and Florian (1989), who also addressed the 
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issue of on-board crowding discomfort. De Cea and Fernandez (1993) linked the line 
frequency at the station level to the flows of passengers either on egress, access or board. 
Cominetti and Correa (2001) further specified the frequency function with respect to 
passenger flow by traffic stream. Cepeda et al (2006) generalized these principles in a 
network assignment model. Other models have been proposed: a recent review is available in 
Leurent and Askoura (2010). 
A major difference between queuing models and assignment models is that the former involve 
the number of passengers waiting on platform as the main state variable, whereas the latter 
ignore it – at least in their static version. Indeed, stock variables have been neglected in static 
traffic assignment so far, despite their recognition in queuing theory which is, basically, 
stationary in nature. 
Objective. This paper addresses the effect of limited vehicle capacity onto passenger waiting 
and route choice at a transit station. It brings about a model of passenger traffic assignment to 
transit lines from a station platform to a given destination. Two scales of analysis are 
integrated, microscopic and macroscopic. 
The microscopic scale pertains to the route choice behaviour of the individual network user in 
relation to the route options, of which the features make up the quality of service that 
determines route choice: here the focus is on the conditions of passenger waiting for service 
vehicles in terms of individual waiting time and the priority rank to avail oneself of some 
place within a vehicle at dwelling. 
At the macroscopic scale, the focus is on the quantitative relationship between vehicle 
capacity and frequency of operation by transit line, on one hand, and the passenger flow 
arriving at the station to get to a given destination, on the other. These macroscopic factors, 
combined with the passenger economic behaviour of route choice and the waiting discipline, 
determine the line attractivity and the size of the passenger stock waiting on the origin 
platform. Thus the interplay of microscopic and macroscopic scales induces a state of traffic 
equilibrium between passenger demand and line services. 
The scope of the model is limited to a single origin-destination pair and passengers that are 
homogeneous save for their instant of arrival in the system. Despite this limitation, the model 
indicates the effect of vehicle capacity on passenger waiting at the platform and the split of 
passenger flow between the available transit lines, yielding insight into physical phenomena 
that involve microeconomic behaviour. 
Approach. The analysis is conditional on the stock size and proceeds along the following 
track. First, there is the issue of vehicle capacity: when a vehicle arrives at the station, would 
its capacity suffice to empty the stock? This is the primary concern if there is one line only. 
Line attractivity is the second and major issue: if several lines link the transit station to the 
destination, then some of them may be less attractive and their vehicles might not be used to 
their full capacity even if it is less than the stock size, should some better ranked passengers 
prefer to wait in order to avail themselves later of a faster line. To each line is associated an 
attractivity threshold that is the maximum stock up to which the line is unattractive: the 
number of passengers boarding a vehicle is the minimum of not only vehicle capacity but also 
the rest of stock size minus attractivity threshold. 
The third issue pertains to station layout and waiting protocol. It is assumed that there is one 
platform with one waiting zone only. Two waiting protocols are considered, either priority 
ranking in a First In First Out manner (save for the access to less attractive lines) versus 
mingled waiting (without priority). Under priority queuing the analysis is based on passenger 
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rank which indicates the size of that part of the stock that holds more priority than the 
passenger 
Fourth and last is addressed the issue of route choice rationality, either selfish individual 
behaviour that leads to user equilibrium or social behaviour that leads to system optimization. 
Contribution. By jointly considering vehicle capacity, line attractivity, waiting discipline and 
type of rationality, based on passenger flow rate and line frequency, conditions for traffic 
equilibrium of passenger demand and line services are stated formally as an attractive bundle 
of lines, i.e. an optimal travel strategy in the words of Spiess and Florian (1989). The 
attractive bundle depends on stock size (or priority rank). The attractivity conditions are 
characterized by a mathematical program, yielding properties of existence and uniqueness of 
traffic equilibrium. Any line will belong to the attractive bundle from its attractivity threshold. 
An efficient algorithm is provided, which extends that of Chriqui and Robillard (1975) to 
capacitated assignment. On assuming large values for the size variables, line choice 
probabilities are derived that involve line capacity i.e. service frequency times vehicle 
capacity, instead of line frequency only. There remains the issue of which size variable would 
correspond to a given origin-destination flow. Our model yields the inverse relationship as it 
derives the exit flow from the stock size. Application to network assignment is addressed in a 
subsequent paper (Leurent, 2009b). Here a Markovian queuing model is developed that 
embodies the full set of assumptions: analytical solutions are provided for simple binary 
cases, with an explicit relationship between OD flow and average size. 
Paper outline. The rest of the paper is structured in six sections. Section 2 recalls the 
uncapacitated model and states the basic framework of a capacitated model: a binary instance 
is used to address the issues of waiting protocol and rationality type. Section 3 develops the 
capacitated model under priority queuing on the basis of an induction principle that pertains to 
the size variable. The concepts of relative capacity, composed costs, attractivity threshold and 
attractive bundle are introduced. Then traffic equilibrium is stated formally and characterized 
by a mathematical program. Structural properties are stated and the assignment algorithm is 
provided. Section 4 develops a parallel analysis for the capacitated model under mingled 
waiting. Section 5 discusses the results in the perspectives of traffic theory and assignment 
models. Section 6 brings about the Markovian queuing model of line attractivity, with explicit 
analytical solution of simple binary cases. Lastly, Section 7 concludes and points to potential 
developments. 
2. The capacitated attractivity problem 
Let us consider a transit station at which a set Z  of lines z  are available to reach the 
destination. By assumption, line z  is serviced at operation frequency zf  by vehicles of 
homogeneous passenger capacity zk . Denote by λ  the flow rate of passenger arrivals at the 
origin station. If only one line is available then queuing is a simple phenomenon that can be 
modelled as a traffic bottleneck in a macroscopic perspective. However, if several lines are 
available there arises the issue of line attractivity: should a passenger prefer to use a line of 
which one vehicle is dwelling and immediately available or to wait for another line 
presumably faster? 
This section is purported to explore the relationship between capacity constraints and line 
attractivity. After recalling the model of attractivity in an uncapacitated system (§2.1), some 
generic properties are stated for a capacitated system about the assignment of passengers to 
attractive lines (§ 2.2). Then, specific properties about the individual waiting time and travel 
time are established under, in turn, priority queuing (§ 2.3) and mingled waiting (§ 2.4): 
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throughout the investigation of specific properties, the statement of principles is illustrated 
using a binary instance. Next, the transition from selfish behaviour to system optimization is 
investigated (§ 2.5). Lastly, the influence of platform layout and management by the station 
operator is discussed (§ 2.6). 
 
 
 
TABLE OF NOTATION 
Z  (resp. A ) Set (resp. subset, bundle) of available lines denoted as z , a  
at  Run time of line a  from platform to destination 
af  Operation frequency of line a  
ak  Supplied passenger capacity in a vehicle of line a  
α  Specific discomfort factor of wait time relative to run time 
aw  Wait time at platform for a vehicle a  to arrive 
ag  (resp. Ag ) Generalized travel time of line a  (resp. of line bundle A )  
n  Size of passenger stock waiting on platform 
)(n
at  
Composed time of line a  
nak /  Attractive capacity of a line a  vehicle, wiith respect to stock size n  
aN  Attractivity threshold of line a  
nθ  Cost (generalized travel time) of reference strategy 
a
n
−θ  Generalized time of strategy alternative to a  
)(nA  Attractive bundle at order n  
)(*N ζ  Generating function of stock size 
nmq  Transition rate from state n  to state m  
λ  Flow rate of passenger arrivals at station 
ϕ  λ= /af  
ρ  Parameter of a geometric sequence 
npi  Stationary probability of state n  
ax  Average passenger boarding in line a  
 
 
 
Leurent F  Capacitated traffic equilibrium 
DRAFT 5/33 June 2011 
2.1 On attractivity in an uncapacitated system 
When a vehicle of line z  is dwelling at the station, every potential user may evaluate the 
opportunity of using it by comparing its planned time to destination, say zt , to the time that 
another line a  can be expected to deliver. Assumedly the alternative line is not available at 
the instant of choice: if its operation is memoryless then the average waiting time is af/1 , 
yielding an expected travel time of 1−+= aaa ftg  or more generally 1−α+= aaa ftg  if the 
user associates a discomfort cost of α  to a unit wait time as compared to a unit in-vehicle 
time. 
Thus the attractivity of service z  requires that 
 az gt ≤ , }{zZa −∈∀ . (2.1)  
The necessary condition (2.1) does not suffice to characterize the set of attractive lines, say 
A , if more than two lines are eligible, in which case each line z  at an instant of availability is 
faced to a set of alternatives so the waiting time for any of them is the minimum of their 
respective waiting times. Denoting by }:{min Bzww zB ∈≡ , the alternative travel time is: 
 ∑
−∈
=−−
−
+α=
zAa
awwzAzA twg zAa }{1 . (2.2)  
On the average,  
 ∑
−∈
−−−−
=+α=≡
zAa
azAazAzAzA twwwgg }{Pr]E[ . (2.3)  
Thus the necessary and sufficient condition for attractivity is that 
 Az ∈   if and only if  zAz gt −≤ . (2.4a)  
 
Chriqui and Robillard (1975) showed that this is equivalent to Az gt ≤  when the services are 
delivered in a Markovian (memoryless) process. Let us demonstrate shortly this property. 
Lemma 0, optimization of a line bundle. Let ZB ⊂  and Bz ∈  with 0>zf  : it holds that  
 Bz gt
>
<   ⇔   zBB gg −
>
< . (2.4b)  
Proof. Decompose ∑
−∈++α= zBa
n
aa
n
zz
n
BB tftfgf )()()(  so )( BzzzBzBBzB gtfgfgf −+= −−− . 
Then zBzBzzBB ffgtgg −− −+= /)( . By the positivity of the frequencies, zBB gg −≥  iff 
Bz gt ≥ , and zBB gg −≤  iff Bz gt ≤ . 
In the absence of any capacity constraint, every user among the passenger stock of size say n  
can take a vehicle of an attractive line when it becomes available. Whatever n , the probability 
to take line a  is proportional to its frequency of operation, yielding a modal share of 
 
A
an
a f
f
=η )( , wherein ∑
∈
≡
Aa
aA ff . (2.5)  
As this does not depend on n , neither does the average modal share of the line, so that 
)(n
aa η=η . 
The minimum wait time of a user for an attractive line is Aw . Under the assumption of 
independent, Markovian services, each random variable zw  is distributed exponential with 
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parameter zf , so the statistical independence implies that Aw  is also an exponential random 
variable with parameter equal to the sum of its operands’ ones i.e. Af . Thus the average wait 
time is: 
 AAA fww /1]E[ =≡ . (2.6)  
Combining (2.3), (2.5) and (2.6) yields the expected travel time by using the attractive set of 
lines: 
 ∑
∈
+
α
=≡
Aa
a
A
a
A
AA tf
f
fgg ]E[ . (2.7)  
Travel time as a random variable Ag  has the same distribution as the independent sum of one 
exponential variable, Aw , multiplied by α  and a mix of deterministic variables at  with given 
proportions Aa ff / . Therefore, its variance is the sum of that of Awα  and the variance of the 
mix which is reduced to its interclass part: 
 ∑
∈
−+
α
=
Aa
Aa
A
a
A
A ttf
f
fg
2
2
2
)(]V[ , (2.8)  
wherein AAa aaA ftft /)(∑ ∈≡ . 
2.2 Attractivity under capacity: generic properties 
In reality, each vehicle for passenger transit has an on-board capacity that is limited. 
Assuming that the vehicles servicing line a  have homogeneous passenger capacity of ak , an 
integer number, then the capacity supplied during a unit time period amounts to aaa kf=κ . 
When the station is serviced by a vehicle of an attractive line a , the number an  of passengers 
that can board in it is limited by both vehicle capacity and the stock size, n : 
 },{min nkn aa = . (2.9)  
It would be naïve, however, to assume that all of the n  waiting passengers would evaluate the 
attractivity in a homogeneous way, independently of their priority rank or the number 
+
− )( akn  of passengers that would eventually remain on platform. To integrate such 
dependencies, let us introduce the notion of attractive capacity, denoted as nak / , of a line a  
vehicle with respect to stock size n . Prior to further specification in Section 3, some basic 
properties must hold for attractive capacity: 
 },{min/ ana knk ≤  as a capacity, (2.10a)  
 1/ ≥nak  if 1≥ak  and line is attractive at 1≥n . (2.10b)  
Under state n , the modal share of line a  becomes proportional to nak / : 
 
∑ ∈
=η
)( /
/)(
nAz nzz
naan
a kf
kf
 if )(nAa ∈  or 0)( =η na  otherwise. (2.11)  
Notation )(nA  means that the attractive set depends on the current state of the system. The 
overall modal share of a line depends on the attractive capacity throughout the current states 
and the probability  npi  of each state throughout time i.e. at any instant of potential arrival for 
a vehicle: 
Leurent F  Capacitated traffic equilibrium 
DRAFT 7/33 June 2011 
 ∑
≥
ηpi=η
1
)(
..
1
n
n
ana n
n
 wherein ∑
≥
pi=
1
.
n
n nn . (2.12)  
From these modal shares stems the average run time between station and destination: 
 ∑
∈
η=
Aa
aaA tt ]E[ . (2.13)  
2.3 Specific properties under priority queuing 
By priority queuing it is meant here that each passenger waiting on the station platform has a 
priority rank, m , which determines his behaviour of line choice that depends on the passenger 
with lesser ranks (meaning higher priority) but not on those with greater rank. Denote by aN  
the maximum rank up to which line a  is not attractive. When a vehicle of that line becomes 
available, it will be taken by those passengers ranking in position ],..1[ / naaa kNNm ++∈  if 
aNn >  or by nobody if aNn ≤ . 
Under that queuing discipline, the attractive capacity and the attractive set depend on the 
priority rank. The waiting time as a random variable is composed in a recursive way as 
follows: 
 ∑
∈
−
+>∈−= ++=
)(
)(
}{]},1[{}{)(
)( ].10.1[1 /
//)(
mAa
km
kNmkNmwwmA
m ma
maamaamAa
www . (2.14)  
On the average, 
 ∑
∈
−
+>+=
)(
)(
}{
)(
)(
)( /
/
.1
mAa
km
kNm
mA
a
mA
m ma
maa
wf
f
ww , (2.15)  
under the convention that 0)0( =w . This formula clearly differs from the average wait time in 
the uncapacitated model, which is reduced to Aw . 
This yields the generalized time of travel as a composed random variable: 
 ∑
∈
−
+>∈−= ++α=
)(
)(
}{]},1[{}{)(
)( ].1.1[1 /
//)(
mAa
km
kNmakNmwwmA
m ma
maamaamAa
gtwg .  (2.16)  
On the average, 
 ∑
∈
−
+>∈− ++α=
)(
)(
}{]},1[{
)(
)(
)( ].1.1[ /
//
mAa
km
kNmakNm
mA
a
mA
m ma
maamaa
gtf
f
wg . (2.17)  
Instance 1. Let us consider two lines a  and b  with run time of ba tt < , respectively, and a 
unit vehicle capacity. This could correspond to two companies of taxi (which indeed is a 
mode for public transportation). Assume that only line a  is attractive for a small passenger 
stock bNn ≤ . The n-th customer must wait for n  vehicles to arrive in order to get one, i.e. 
∑
=
α+= ni
i
aa
n wtg 1
)()(
 , yielding 
 
1)( −α+= aa
n fntg . (2.18)  
Line b  becomes attractive from 1+= bNn  such that 
 
11)( )1( −− +α+<≤α+= abababaN fNttfNtg b , (2.19)  
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hence 1)( +<−≤
α bab
f
b NttN a , or equivalently 
 )](Int[ abab tt
fN −
α
= . (2.20)  
For bNn > , 
)1(1)( ][ −− +++α= nbbaaZn gtftffg . 
In particular, at ,1+= bNn  τ++α=
−+ 1)1( )1( ZbN fNg b , in which Zbbaa ftftf /)( +≡τ . 
For 1+≥ bNn , τ+α=+−−α=+α=
−−−−− 1)1(1)1(1)( )1( ZNZbnZn fngfNngfg b . (2.21)  
For numerical illustration let us take 60=α  min/h, == ba ff  10/h, =at  20’ and =bt  40’. 
Then 3=bN  and '30=τ , yielding the following sequence of average travel times 
]1:[ )( ≥ng n  = {26’, 32’, 38’, 39’, 42’, 45’… regular step +3’}. 
It turns out that line b  is attractive from 4=n , despite btg =<= '40'39
)4(
. This apparent 
paradox makes an obvious difference to the uncapacitated model. 
2.4 Specific properties under mingled waiting 
‘Mingled waiting’ is a better wording than ‘Mingled queuing’ to define a system such that 
every waiting passenger has an equal chance of boarding in a dwelling vehicle, with success 
probability of nk na //  which is null if line a  is unattractive at stock size n . 
‘Naïve mingled waiting’ means that a waiting passenger evaluates the attractivity of an 
immediately available service, say a , with respect to other services not yet available by 
considering that the stock size remains at nakn /−  after the departure of the present vehicle, 
thus neglecting the eventual arrival of subsequent passengers on the platform. The random 
variable associated with this (myopically) estimated wait time satisfies that 
 
)(
)(
/
}{)(
)( 1
)(
}{}{}{)(
)(
/
)(
/
//)(
)1(1
]10.11[1
na
nAa
na
nananAa
kn
nAa
na
wwnA
nAa
n
i
kn
kikiwwnA
n
w
n
k
w
w
n
ww
−
∈
=
∈ =
−
>≤=
∑
∑ ∑
−+=
++=
 (2.22)  
This yields an average wait time of 
 ∑
∈
−
−
−
=+=
)(
)(
)(
/)()(
)( /
/
}{Pr
nAa
kn
knA
na
nAanA
n na
na
w
n
kn
wwww . (2.23)  
The estimated travel time satisfies that 
 
∑
∑ ∑
∈
−
=
∈ =
−
>≤=
−+
+α=
++α=
)(
)(
//
}{)(
)( 1
)(
}{}{}{)(
)(
/
)(
/
//)(
)(1
]111[1
nAa
kn
naana
wwnA
nAa
n
i
kn
kiakiwwnA
n
n
gkntk
w
gt
n
wg
na
nAa
na
nananAa
. (2.24)  
Thus the average travel time is 
 ∑
∈
−
−+
+α=
)(
)(
//
)(
)(
)( /)(
nAa
kn
naana
nA
a
nA
n
n
gkntk
f
f
wg
na
. (2.25)  
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Instance 1 (continued). Let us now assume that waiting passengers are mingled. As long as 
only line a  is attractive, the average travel time satisfies that 
 ][ )1(11)( −−++α= n
n
n
ana
n gtwg , (2.26)  
Hence  aa
nn fntgngn /)1( )1()( α+=−− − . (2.27)  
Summing that from 1 to n  and dividing by n  yields  
 
2
1)( +α+= nftg aa
n
. (2.28)  
This result is intuitive as it would take n  vehicles to service n  passengers, yielding average 
total wait time of 2/)1(1 +=∑ = nnwiw ania  to be shared equally between the waiting 
passengers (in their myopic estimation). 
Line b  becomes attractive from 1+= bNn  such that 
 
1
2
11
2
1)( )1( −− +α+<≤α+= abababaN fNttfNtg b , (2.29)  
yielding 
 )](2Int[ abfb ttN a −=′ α . (2.30)  
At bNn ′> , 
)1(111)( )1( −− −+τ+α= n
nnZ
n gfg , or, equivalently, 
 
1)1()( )1( −− α+τ=−− Znn fngngn . (2.31)  
Summing that over n  from 1+′bN  to n  yields  
1
2
1)()( )]1()1([)( −′ α+′′−++τ′−=′− ZbbbNbn fNNnnNngNgn b  
 
Z
bbbNbn
fn
NN
n
n
Ng
n
Ng b
2
])1(1[)1()()( α+′′−++τ′−+′= ′ . (2.32)  
Numerically, 5=′bN  and at 6=n , btg =<= '403
119)6(
. 
2.5 On routing behaviour and system operations 
The waiting time and the travel time considered so far are individual times as perceived by a 
service user who tries to minimize his travel time on a selfish behaviour. Let us define system 
optimization as the reduction of the global travel time over all passengers. This objective 
could be pursued using various instruments, including (i) service design by setting run time, 
dwelling time, operation frequency and vehicle capacity, (ii) station design by adapting the 
platform layout, (iii) social route choice i.e. every user obeys to a collective rationality, 
perhaps by following route guidance provided by a network supervisor. The latter instrument 
involves the evaluation of overall travel time, denoted hereafter as )(nG  with respect to stock 
size n . 
When service a  is available, the routing decision is whether to use it and reduce stock size, 
yielding system cost of )1( −+ nGta , or not to use it and maintain stock size, yielding cost 
)(nG . Thus line a  is socially attractive at state n  if  
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 )()1( nGnGta ≤−+ . (2.33) 
This condition can be applied recursively to yield social attractive capacity and attractivity 
threshold. 
Under priority queuing, ∑
=
=
n
i
ignG 1
)(
PQPQ )(  so social attractivity is reduced to )(PQna gt ≤ , i.e. 
individual attractivity to the passenger last in stock. In other words, priority queuing is 
socially optimal. The reason underlying this property is the assumption that a passenger with 
larger rank (meaning lower priority) is able to board in a line vehicle that is unattractive to 
those users ranking first, by going through the stock without causing opposition. 
Under mingled waiting, a myopic supervisor would evaluate )(MW nG  as )(MWngn . Then the 
condition for social attractivity becomes 
 
)1(
MW
)(
MW )1( −−−≤ nna gngnt , (2.34) 
i.e. line run time must be less than marginal overall travel time. From the definition of )(MW
ng  
in (2.25), if AnAnA =−= )1()(  then 
])1()()[(
)1(
)1(
MW1/
)(
MW/1//
)1(
MW
)(
MW
1//∑
∈
−−
−
−
−
−
−
−−−−+−=
−−
Aa
kn
na
kn
naanana
A
a
nn
nana gkngkntkkf
f
gngn
 
As will be shown in Section 4, ]},.1[{}{1// 11 /1/ aanana kNnkknana kk ∈−<− ==− −  if Aa ∈ . 
Consequently, 
}{/}{/1/ /1//1/ 1111 nananana kknakknana knknkn =<− −− +−=+−−=−− . 
Furthermore, if Aa ∈  then aNn >−1  hence }{ /1/1 nana kk =−  is reduced to }{1 aa kNn +> . 
In turn,  
])1()[(1
)1()(
)1(
MW
)(
MW}{
)1(
MW1/
)(
MW/
1//
knkn
kNn
kn
na
kn
na
gkngkn
gkngkn
aa
nana
−−−
+>
−−
−
−
−−−−=
−−−−
−
 
Thus 
( )])1()[(11
)1(
)1(
MW
)(
MW}{]},1[{
)1(
MW
)(
MW
knkn
kNnakNn
Aa A
a
nn
gkngkntf
f
gngn
aaaa
−−−
+>∈−
∈
−
−−−−+=
−−
∑
 (2.35) 
Comparing (2.35) to (2.17) and by induction on stock size, it turns out that the marginal 
overall travel time under mingled waiting is identical to the individual travel time under 
priority queuing for the last passenger in the stock – indeed a remarkable result. 
This holds also if some lines not in )1( −nA  are included in )(nA , cf. Appendix §9.1. 
2.6 On platform layout 
Let us emphasize once again the difference between MW and PQ. Under MW, all waiting 
passengers have identical priority, availability and evaluation to any vehicle. Under PQ each 
passenger has a position in stock that amounts to a priority rank. The possibility to traverse 
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the stock in order to board in a less attractive vehicle may be called a ‘property of porosity’, 
which is crucial to achieve social optimum as well as selfish optimization. However priority 
may only be reserved within one stock, leading to the issue of ‘Why should passenger traffic 
be organized into a single stock?’ In practice, this depends on platform layout as implemented 
by the network operator. Each route service is assigned to a given dwelling slot (a point for a 
bus or a stretch for a train) so a stock can take place on the boarding zone associated to the 
slot. If the slot is assigned dynamically, as may happen in a line terminal or a large train 
station, then it is likely that the stock would take place in some waiting area for passengers to 
wait for dynamic information before and prior to a vehicle: here MW is the relevant 
discipline. 
Let us restrict ourselves to slots and boarding zones assigned in the long run to given services. 
Then one boarding zone is assigned to a subset of transit services; in train transportation 
sharing the zone requires sharing the running track, which implies that the assigned services 
must be operated in a coordinated manner – they must belong to one line of railway operation. 
Taking position in a given boarding zone supplies a passenger with some priority to access 
the associated services over those passengers who would decide dynamically (e.g. at the 
arrival of a vehicle) to try to board. So if the zone is populated by a stock that would saturate 
the next vehicle, there is no possibility for any other customer to succeed in immediate 
boarding. Then the user’s route choice must proceed in two steps: first, the selection of a 
waiting place among the boarding areas; second, the choice of a service associated to that area 
– or alternatively of a service that would dwell at an unsaturated area. 
To sum up, station layout involves fixed or dynamic assignment of services to dwelling slots. 
Dynamic assignment requires a specific area to wait for dynamic information. Platform layout 
involves one or several slots. Services that share a given slot are likely to belong to one line of 
operation. When several services are operated, if some of the associated areas are saturated 
then every customer must choose their route in two stages, first a waiting place then a service. 
The rest of the paper deals with one boarding zone only. 
3. Priority Queuing model 
Priority Queuing involves the axiomatic assumption that a customer with more priority is 
likely to enjoy a reduced travel time (or cost), at least on the average if not in all instances. 
Denoting by m  the customer rank in the stock of passengers, this is stated as follows: 
Assumption 1, PQ regularity: the system is regular up to rank n  if  1+θ≤θ mm  nm <∀ . 
3.1 Attractivity conditions and concepts 
Definition 1, PQ attractivity. Line a  is attractive at order m  if mat θ≤ . 
PQ attractivity means that if a vehicle of line a  is available, then it yields profit to the 
customer in rank m , either because he gets a place on board or his rank is decreased (i.e. 
improved). 
Definition 2, The PQ attractivity threshold of line a , denoted as aN , is the maximum rank 
1≥m  at which line a  is unattractive, or zero otherwise. 
By transitivity of inequality, if mθ  is increasing up to 1+m  then 11 ... ++ θ≤θ≤≤θ≤ mmNa at . 
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Proposition 1, PQ attractivity continuation. Assuming PQ regularity up to n , line a  is 
attractive at all orders from 1+aN  to n . 
Then any customer ranking from 1+aN  to aa kN +  would take a vehicle if line a  were 
available. 
The correct number of boarding passengers, however, is bounded by the number of such 
customers on the platform, yielding that: 
Definition 3, The PQ attractive capacity of line a  with respect to rank n  is 
 })(,{min/ +−≡ aana knkk . (3.1) 
3.2 Composed travel time and attractive set 
Assume that the sequence mθ  is known at least up to order 1−n : then the attractive 
thresholds which are less than or equal to 1−n  are known, since }:{max ama tmN ≤θ= . Put 
more correctly, the attractive threshold of any line a  with 1−θ< nat  is known with certainty 
and satisfies that 1−< nNa , while a line with 1−θ≥ nat  may have either 1−= nNa  if at  
were nθ<  or nNa ≥  otherwise. 
Let us associate to each line a candidate time for potential attractivity at order n . 
Definition 4. The PQ composed time of line a  at order n  is 
 
aaaaa knkNnakNn
n
a tt −+>+≤ θ+≡ }{}{)( 11ˆ . (3.2) 
Lemma 1. (i) If the mθ  are known up to 1−n  and 1≥ak  then )(ˆ nat  is unambiguous. 
(ii) Assuming regularity up to 1−n , it holds that )1()( ˆˆ −≥ nana tt . 
Proof. (i) If 1−θ< nat  then 1−< nNa  yielding an unambiguous result. Otherwise, if 
1−θ≥ nat  then 1−≥ nNa  hence nkN aa ≥+  since 1≥ak , so that ana tt =)(ˆ . 
(ii) If aa kNn +≤  then so is 1−n  hence )1()( ˆˆ −== naana ttt . If aa kNn +>  then akn
n
at −θ=)(ˆ : 
either aa kNn +>−1  so that aa knkn
n
at −−−
− θ≤θ= 1)1(ˆ  by regularity since 1−≤− nkn a , or 
aa kNn +=−1  hence 
)(
1
)1(
ˆˆ
n
aknNa
n
a ttt aa =θ=θ≤= −+
−
 owing to the definition of the 
attractivity threshold. 
 
Definition 5, bundle cost. At order n  the cost of a line bundle ZB ⊂  is defined as 
 ∑ ∈+
α
≡ Ba
n
a
B
a
B
n
B tf
f
fg
)()(
ˆ
. (3.3) 
3.3 Attractive set and user equilibrium 
Definition 6, Attractive set at order n . This is a line bundle ZB ⊂  such that 
 
)(n
Ba gt <   Ba ∈⇒ , (3.4a) 
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)(n
Ba gt >   Ba ∉⇒ . (3.4b) 
These conditions state the demand side of User Equilibrium (UE) in a transit system. Let us 
show that these correspond to a travel strategy (here a line bundle) of minimal cost. 
Theorem 1, Existence of an Attractive Set at order n  under PQ: Assuming that PQ 
regularity holds up to 1−n , then at order n : 
(i) There exists a line bundle ZnB ⊂)(  that minimizes )()( Bg n . 
(ii) 1)( )( −θ≥≡θ nnnBn g . 
(iii) Any bundle )(nB  of minimal cost is attractive. 
(iv)  nNnBa a ≥∉∀ ),( . 
(v) 1),( 1 −=⇒θ>∈∀ − nNtnBa ana . 
(vi) Any attractive bundle is of minimal cost. 
Proof. (i) Assuming that Z  is finite, then the set of bundles is finite, yielding a finite set of 
real values )()( Bg n , among which one is minimal. 
(ii) From Lemma 1 point (ii), )1()( ˆˆ −≥ nana tt  hence )1( )1()1( )()( )( −−− ≥≥ nnBnnBnnB ggg  which defines 
1−θn , due to point (i) in the Theorem applied at the previous order. Thus 1−θ≥θ nn . 
(iii) As in the uncapacitated problem of optimal travel strategy: if nat θ<  and Ba ∉  then by 
regularity )(ˆ nat  is less than nθ  so }{aBB ∪≡′  would improve on minimal cost, which would 
contradict the assumption of optimality. Similarly, if nat θ>  and Ba ∈  then ana tt =)(ˆ  so 
}{aBB −≡′  would yield a cost lower than nθ . 
(iv) By (iii) and contraposition of (3.4a), ⇒∉ )(nBa nat θ≥ : thus nNa ≥ . 
(v) By (iii) and contraposition of (3.4b), natnBa θ≤⇒∈ )(  yielding 1−≤ nNa . But if 
1−θ> nat  then 1−≥ nNa : the conjunction of both conditions yields 1−= nNa . 
(vi) It holds that Za ∈∀ , },{min)( anna tt θ≤  since if nat θ>  then nNa ≥  hence nkN aa >+  
hence a
n
a tt =
)(
. Let us consider an attractive bundle A  with cost )(nAg : attractiveness implies 
that AZa −∈∀ , )(nAa gt ≥  while by the optimality of )(nB , )( )()( nnBnA gg ≥ , so nat θ≥ . Now 
let }:{ natZaA θ≥∈≡′ : it holds that Aa ′∈∀ , ana tt =)( . If ∅≠′A  then its lines can be 
pooled into an option of frequency Af ′  and average run time AAa aaA ftft ′′∈′ ∑= /)(  that is 
less than )(nAg  by the attractivity property which is maintained through convex combination. 
By lemma 0, if A
n
A tg ′>
)(
 then )(n AAA gt ′−′ ≤  and 
)()( n
AA
n
A gg ′−≤ : but 
)(
)(
)( n
nB
n
AA gg =′−  because 
their definitions are equivalent. So )( )(
)( n
nB
n
A gg =  i.e. the attractive bundle has an optimal cost. 
Corollary 1: Existence and uniqueness of User Equilibrium (UE) under PQ.  
(i) Any attractive bundle is an optimal travel strategy for the user waiting at n . 
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(ii) The optimal cost is consistent with the relative capacities, so the attractive bundle is a UE 
state. 
(iii) The optimal value nθ  is unique and there is a unique minimal attractive set of optimal 
cost, defined as }:)({)(~ natnBanB θ<∈≡ . 
Proof. (i) Stems from point (vi) in Theorem 1.  
(ii) stems from the definition of function )(ng , which implies that any vehicle of line 
)(nBa ∈  will be demanded by 1/ ≥nak , whereas point (iv) of Th.1 implies that 0/ =nak  for 
)(nBa ∉ , yielding a consistent assessment of cost by the n-th user. 
(iii) involves point (i) in Th.1 and Lemma 0 – there would be no loss of optimality by 
outsourcing any line with nat θ=  from the optimal bundle, while optimality would be lost by 
outsourcing any line with nat θ< . 
3.4 The formation of optimal bundles 
Corollary 2: Continuation of regularity under PQ. Assume that sequence )( )(n nBn g=θ  is 
obtained incrementally: then regularity holds at any order. 
Proof. At order 1, ana tt =)(ˆ  for all Za ∈  if 1≥ak . Thus 01 θ=θ  which yields regularity at 
order 1. Now, if regularity holds up to 1−n , then Lemma 1 holds and so does Th.1, of which 
point (ii) ensures that 1−θ≥θ nn  i.e. regularity up to order n  included. By induction, 
regularity holds at any order. 
Corollary 3: Enlargement of optimal bundle under PQ. The minimal optimum bundle of 
order m  is included in the optimal bundles of any subsequent order. 
Proof. If )(~ mBa ∈  minimal then mat θ<  hence nat θ<  mn ≥∀ : then point (iii) in Th.1 at 
order n  implies that )(nBa ∈ . 
The recursive formation of the minimum cost and the associated optimal bundle amounts to a 
recursive algorithm to solve for UE up to any order. Based on Corollary 3, from order 1−n  
an efficient implementation would be to test )1()(0 −≡ nBA n  as a candidate optimal bundle at 
order n , yielding cost )(0
ng : having ranked the lines a  in order of increasing at , then those 
lines not in )(niA  but with 
)(n
ia gt <  should be included in 
)(
1
n
iA + : this should end up when 
there remains no line or the next line satisfies )( )()()( ninnia Aggt ≡> , yielding )()( niAnB ≡ . 
4. Mingled Waiting model 
In this Section, MW is addressed in much the same manner as PQ in Section 3, except for one 
significant peculiarity: under MW the composed time of a line may be less than the line run 
time even if the attractive capacity is strictly positive at that order. This obliges us to state 
more elaborate conditions for UE. 
4.1 Basic concepts 
Recall that the main state variable under MW is the stock size, denoted by n . 
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Definition 7, The recourse option to line a  under stock size n  is to remain on platform 
rather than to board in a vehicle of line a . Let an−θ  denote its average travel time (or cost). 
The sequences 0)( ≥−θ nan  for Za ∈  summarize the waiting strategy of a user. 
Definition 8, The relative capacity of line a  with respect to the recourse option mam )( −θ  and 
stock size n  is the integer number nak /  that solves the following system: 
 imax  such that (4.1a)  
 aki ≤≤0 , (4.1b)  
 ni ≤ , (4.1c)  
 
a
inat
−
+−θ≤ 1  if 1≥i . (4.1d)  
If sequence m
a
m )( −θ  increases up to n , then the solution i  of (4.1) is limited by one of its 
linear constraints. If },{min nki a=  then (4.1d) holds at i  and potentially beyond i . If 
},{min nki a<  then (4.1d) cannot hold at 1+i  i.e. ainat −−θ> . 
Definition 9, The MW attractivity threshold of line a  with respect to the recourse option 
m
a
m )( −θ  is 
 }:0{max 1amaa tmN − +θ≤≥≡ . (4.2)  
Lemma 2. If sequence mam )( −θ  increases with m  up to n  then the relative capacity and the 
attractivity threshold of line a  are linked by 
 })(,{min/ +−= aana Nnkk . (4.3)  
Proof. Let nakk /= . From its definition in (4.1b-c), 0≥k  and },{min nkk a≤ . If 0>n  and 
0=k  then (4.1d) does not hold at 1=i , which requires that aNn ≤  since the sequence am−θ  
increases : then 0)( =− +aNn  which satisfies (4.3). If 0>k  then in the definitional program 
(4.1d) is equivalent to +−≤ )( aNni , hence the maximal solution is })(,{min +− aa Nnk  i.e. 
(4.3). 
Thus relative capacity is also an attractive capacity. 
4.2 Axiomatic regularity and its consequences 
Definition 10, Under MW and stock n , travel time to the destination is a random variable, 
denoted nθ , with average value denoted as nθ . 
Definition 11: MW regularity. The system is regular up to order n  if, nm <∀ ,  
 1+θ≤θ mm , (4.4a)  
 
a
m
a
m
−
+
− θ≤θ 1 , Za ∈∀ , (4.4b)  
 
a
mm
−θ≤θ , Za ∈∀ . (4.4c)  
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Definition 12: MW composed time. To line a  with respect to stock size n , the composed 
time is the random variable that mixes at  with nakn /−θ  in proportion of nk na //  and 
nk na /1 /− , respectively. At 0=n  by convention }{/
1
0
1 θ≤= atnan k . The expected composed 
time is 
 
nakn
na
a
nan
a
n
k
t
n
k
t
/
)1( //)(
−
θ−+≡ . (4.5)  
Lemma 3, origin of a composed time. Assuming that (i) sequence nθ  increases with m  up 
to n , (ii) amm −θ≤θ  and (iii) 1≥aN , then ama tt <)(  at least up to 1+aN . 
Proof. For aNn ≤ , 0/ =nak  hence nnat θ=)(  which is less than an−θ  by (ii), hence at<  since 
aNn ≤ . At 1+= aNn , 
)(n
at  is a convex combination with strictly positive coefficients of at  
and 
aNθ  which is at< , which implies that the outcome is at< . 
This property distinguishes the capacitated model from the uncapacitated one, in which any 
attractive line checks that Aa gt ≤  as stated in Section 2. This inequality holds for a 
capacitated line only if it is attractive from the origin i.e. 0=aN . 
Lemma 4, development of the expected composed time. Assuming that (i)  regularity holds 
up to n  and (ii)  amat −θ≤  for nm ≤ . Then )(iat  increases with }1,,...1,{ ++∈ nnmmi . 
Proof. By assumption mNa <  hence iNa < . By (4.3) the sequence iak /  increases with i . If 
aa kNi <−  then 1/1/ +=+ iaia kk  (which holds also at ni =  even if an−+θ 1  is not yet known) 
hence aiaia Nkiki =−=−+ + /1/1  so that, letting iakk /= , 
0
)(
))(()(
)1(
1
1
1
1
1)()1(
≥
θ−=
−−θ+−=−
+
+−+
++
a
a
Naii
N
iikii
k
i
k
a
i
a
i
a
t
kittt
 
since if 0=aN  then the right-hand side is zero whereas if 0>aN  then aa N
a
Nat θ≥θ> −  from 
the definition of aN  and assumption (ii). 
If aa kNi ≥−  then aiaia kkk ==+ /1/  denoted as k , yielding that 
kikikiaii
k
i
ki
kii
ki
kiaii
ki
a
i
a
t
ttt
−−+−++
−
−+
−+
−++
−
+
θ−θ+θ−−=
θ−θ+=−
11)1(
1
1
1)1(
)()1(
)(
 
The outcome is 0≥  since by assumption 01 ≥θ−θ −−+ kiki  and because one out of the two 
following conditions holds: 
- either kiat −θ≤  so, as kiki −+− θ≤θ 1 , by transitivity 1+−θ≤ kiat  which yields the 
claimed outcome, 
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- or kiat −θ>  which implies that akikiki t−θ≥θ−θ −+−−+ 11 . Then, as ki > , 
0))(()())(1( 1211 ≥θ−θ−+≥−θ+θ−θ+ −−+−+−−+ kikiakikiki kiitkii , which yields that 
0)()1( ≥−+ iaia tt . 
4.3 MW attractivity and user equilibrium 
Definition 13: Relative attractivity. Line a  is attractive with respect to recourse option 
m
a
m )( −θ  and stock size n  iff 
 
a
nat
−θ≤ . (4.6)  
This condition is microeconomic as it characterizes the user’s individual choice behaviour: 
were line a  immediately available, the user would compare its run cost at  to the recourse 
cost of waiting for another service, an
−θ . 
By the transitivity of inequality, if the recourse costs am
−θ  increase up to n  then if line a  is 
attractive at m , so it remains at any order }..1,{ nmmi +∈ . 
Definition 14: Average bundle cost. At order n  the expected cost of a line bundle ZB ⊂  is, 
under MW, 
 ∑ ∈+
α
≡ Ba
n
a
B
a
B
n
B tf
f
fg
)()(
. (4.7)  
Definition 15: MW Attractive bundle. At order n  a line bundle ZB ⊂  is attractive iff, 
denoting by }:{maxarg* BbtB b ∈≡ : 
 Ba ∈∀ ,  },{max )(
*1
n
BB
a
na gt
−
−
−
θ≤ , (4.8a)  
 BZa −∈∀ ,  )(nBa gt ≥ . (4.8b)  
Condition (4.8a) provides a precise definition for an−θ  in (4.6) on the basis of, first, the route 
choice opportunities at the previous order, second, a recourse option *BB −  that is more 
elaborate than aB −  and involves some transitivity. When there are several lines in the 
bundle, a recourse cost of the form )(n aBg −  might not be greater than at  would the bundle 
include a line other than a  and that would have a little larger run time but a much higher 
frequency. 
These are theoretical conditions for user equilibrium in transit traffic under MW: (a) the cost 
at  of an attractive option that is immediately available is less than the highest recourse cost 
among attractive options, (b) an unattractive option even if it is immediately available has a 
larger cost than that of bundle B . 
The set of conditions (4.8) involves three significant differences from the classical Wardrop 
conditions for assignment to a private mode of transportation. First, the fragmentary 
availability of transit services requires to distinguish between line cost when available and 
travel cost. Second, the distinction between )(
*
n
BBg −  and 
)(n
Bg  is necessary to state the influence 
of capacity constraints on attractivity under MW – contrary to both uncapacitated or 
capacitated under PQ. Third, the recursive formation of composed cost hence of bundle cost 
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internalizes the capacity constraints, which differs from the formulations of capacitated User 
Equilibrium for private transportation that involves dual variables (e.g. Larsson and 
Patriksson, 1994). 
4.4 The recursive structure of attractive bundles 
At order 1=n , the composed cost of any capacitated line with 1≥ak  is reduced to at , 
yielding user equilibrium (UE) conditions (4.8) that amount to the uncapacitated problem of 
attractivity. The a−θ1  must be set to 
)1(
)1( aBg − . 
This provides the origin for the progressive determination of UE at any subsequent order. 
Theorem 2: Existence and uniqueness of UE at order n  under MW. Assume that 
a
nat
−
−
θ≤ 1   )1( −∈∀ nBa . At order n  let us associate to any bundle ZB ⊂  a companion 
bundle }:{ )()( nBbnB gtBZbC <−∈≡ . 
(i) Any attractive bundle satisfies that ∅=)(nBC . 
(ii) If ∅≠− )1(nB  then there exists an attractive bundle )(nB  at order n . 
(iii) )(nB  contains )1( −nB : the residual lines )1()( −−∈ nBnBb  have 1−= nNb , while 
those in )(nBZ −  have nNb ≥ . 
(iv) Let )( )(nnBn g≡θ , nan θ≡θ−  )(nBZa −∈∀  and },{max )( *)()(1 n nBnBanan g −−−− θ≡θ   )(nBa ∈∀ : 
then 1−θ≥θ nn , anan −−− θ≥θ 1  and ann −θ≤θ . 
(v) Bundle )(nB  so determined is unique: any other attractive bundle would be the union of 
)(nB  and other lines b  with )( )(nnBb gt = , yielding identical cost. 
Proof. (i) If B  is attractive then (4.8b) holds so any BZz −∈  has )(nBz gt ≥ , thus making 
)(n
BC  an empty set. 
(ii) Lemma 4 ensures that )1()( −≥ nana tt  Za ∈∀  so that for any bundle B , )1()( −≥ nBnB gg . Thus 
(4.8a) is satisfied at order n  for the lines of maximal run time in )1( −nB . Now, if )( )1(nnBC −  is 
empty then (4.8b) holds, too, making )1( −nB  an attractive set at order n . 
If ∅≠
−
)(
)1(
n
nBC  then apply the following algorithm to augment )1( −nB  into bundle B . While 
∅≠)(nBC , take b  in it with minimum bt : by definition 
)(n
Bb gt < , which ensures that in turn 
1
11)( )1(
−
θ−+≡ nnbn
n
b tt  is 
)(n
Bg< . Consider now }{bBB ∪≡′ : as )(nBb gt <  and bBB −′= , 
(4.8a) holds for B′  since }:{maxarg Batb a ′∈∈ . Furthermore, by Lemma 0 it holds that 
)()( n
B
n
B gg <′ . As 
)(
)1(
n
nBCb −∈  then 1−θ≥ nbt  and 1
)(
−
θ≥ n
n
bt  in turn, yielding 1
)(
−′
θ≥ n
n
Bg  by 
convex combination of two terms each one larger than 1−θn . The companion set 
)(n
BC ′  must be 
smaller than )(nBC  since the limiting cost is decreased. By replacing B  with B′ , the process 
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must terminate in at most )Card( )( )1(nnBC −  steps, yielding in the end a final B′  that satisfies 
(4.8b) as well as (4.8a): this is kept as )(nB  and its line of maximum run time as )(* nB . 
(iii) From (ii), )()1( nBnB ⊂− . If )1( −∉ nBb  then 1−θ≥ nbt  so that 1−≥ nNb . If )(nBb ∈  
then )(
*
n
BBb gt −<  so that nNb < : at the intersection )1()( −−∈ nBnBb , 1−= nNb . 
(iv) 1)( −θ≥ nnBg  has been shown to hold throughout the building process, yielding in the end 
1
)(
)( −θ≥ n
n
nBg . 
If )(nBZa −∈  then 11 −−− θ=θ nan  and nan θ=θ−  so that anan −−− θ≥θ 1  and nan θ≥θ− . 
If )(nBa ∈ , then either )1( −∈ nBa  in which case the basic assumption anat −−θ≤ 1  applies, or 
)1()( −−∈ nBnBa  in which case ba tt ≤  with )(* nBb∈  so )( *)(n BnBb gt −≤  yielding 
)(
*)(
n
BnBa gt −≤ : in both cases 
a
nat
−θ≤  from its definition, which also implies that anan −−− θ≥θ 1  
and n
a
n θ≥θ−  since n
n
BnBg θ≥−
)(
*)( . 
(v) At every order 2≥n , the process of line inclusion into current bundle cannot stop sooner 
unless it begins with a strictly smaller set )1( −nB . By induction, this would compel )1(B  to 
be smaller than it is, which cannot hold since there exists a minimum solution to the 
uncapacitated problem that is unique except for degenerate cases with )1( )1(Bb gt = . So the 
sequence nθ  is unique, and any attractive bundle must include the minimum attractive bundle 
plus eventually some lines that are degenerate at the current order. 
4.5 An incremental user equilibrium algorithm 
To determine an attractive bundle i.e. a state of UE at any order n  requires to determine 
attractive bundles at all previous orders so as to obtain the composed costs and the attractivity 
thresholds. Here is a streamlined algorithm: 
Origin. Solve the uncapacitated UE, yielding }0:{)1( =∈= aNZaB , 1θ  and a−θ1   
Za ∈∀ . Let 2:=m . 
Progression. Based on m<θ ll )( , evaluate the composed costs )(mat  for )1( −∈ mBa  and 
let )1(: −= mBB . 
Inclusion process. While ∅≠)(mBC  do: select }:{minarg )(mBb Cbtb ∈∈ , let 
}{: bBB ∪=′ , 111)( : −− θ+= mmmbm
m
b tt , bBB fff +=′ : , BmbbmBBmB ftfgfg ′′ += /][: )()()( , 
then replace B  by B′ . 
Termination test. Let BmB ′=:)( , )(: mBm g ′=θ  and )(: mBm g ′=θ . If nm =  then terminate 
else let 1: += mm  and go to Progression. 
The space complexity of the algorithm is )||.( ZnO . So is its time complexity since each 
order requires to evaluate the composed costs on all of the presently attractive lines; the 
inclusion process involves less operations since any line will become attractive only once. Of 
course it is convenient to deal with set Z  as a list of lines ordered by increasing run time. 
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5. From traffic theory to network assignment 
Our theory of passenger waiting and route choice at a transit station amounts to a fundamental 
traffic diagram for a bundle of transit lines, i.e. a relationship between three state variables of, 
respectively, concentration, flow and speed or travel time (§ 5.1). Thus travel time can be 
modelled as a function of either stock size or exit flow (§ 5.2). The model of route choice 
yields formulae to split the passenger flow between the transit lines, with remarkable limit 
properties for large stock sizes (§ 5.3). Also provided are approximate formulae for travel 
time and wait time under the assumption of continuous and constant stock and flow (§ 5.4). 
Lastly, some references are made to previous models of capacitated transit assignment (§ 5.5). 
5.1 A fundamental traffic diagram for a line bundle 
Since the seminal paper of Greenshields (1935), the fundamental diagram of traffic has been a 
cornerstone in the analysis of car traffic along a roadway section (e.g. HCM, 2010). It 
involves three state variables that are (i) the vehicle concentration or density (in veh/km by 
traffic lane), (ii) the average flow speed (in km/h) or equivalently the travel time and (iii) the 
vehicle flow (in veh/h). The diagram relates one variable to another, notably speed versus 
density or flow versus density. Furthermore, under the stationary regimes of traffic the flow is 
equal to the product of speed and density. 
For a line bundle, i.e. a set of transit services available from a station platform (which makes 
the tail node of each service as modelled as a network link), the three state variables are, 
respectively: (i) the size of passenger stock, n ; (ii) the average individual travel time to 
destination, nθ ; (iii) the exit flow that leaves the platform, Zx . Using the previous notation, 
the relationship between nθ  and n  has been indicated for waiting discipline either priority 
queuing or mingling. The relationship between the flow and stock size is as follows: 
 ∑ ∈= Zz nzzZ kfnx /)( , (5.1) 
which is based on the relative capacities. Recalling that })(,{min/ +−= zznz Nnkk , it is an 
increasing function of n  so )(nxZ  increases with n , too. 
Indeed, relationship (5.1) is the transit counterpart of the traffic linkage between car flow, 
speed and density in roadway traffic: stock size and density are analogous, while line 
frequency plays a role similar to flow speed. 
5.2 Travel time function for a line bundle 
As the average travel time also increases with n , there exists an increasing relationship 
between the travel time and the exit flow: let us denote it by )(T xZ=θ , in which  
 
1xT −θ≡ ZZ o . (5.2) 
Similar properties do not hold in general for the average waiting time when there are several 
lines, because if a given line becomes attractive then its inclusion in the attractive bundle 
reduces the wait time. When the bundle contains one line only, wait time is an increasing 
function of stock size (or exit flow). 
Of course, our model of transit bundle is limited to one destination and homogeneous 
passengers. Realistic application requires dealing with important network features such as 
flow loading along a service line, which relates the capacity provided at a given station to the 
entry and exit flows at the upstream stations. However our model demonstrates that passenger 
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stock is an important state variable, whatever the traffic regime dynamic or static i.e. 
stationary. A simple problem of static assignment would be to impose an origin-destination 
volume of customers, say q  during a reference period H , to the line bundle: assuming 
stationarity, the equality between entry and exit flow and the condition )(x nq Z=  would 
yield n : 
 )/(x 1 Hqn Z−= , (5.3a) 
 nZ Hq θ≡)/(T . (5.3b) 
Thus the line bundle may be used as a store-and-forward element in a network problem. 
5.3 Flow split formulae 
Given the passenger stock, the service flow that is assigned to line a  is simply 
 naaa kfnx /)( = . (5.4) 
which amounts to attractive capacity at the service level. 
Then the flow share of service a  is 
 
∑ ∈
=≡η
Zz nzz
naa
Z
a
a kf
kf
nx
nx
n
/
/
)(
)()( . (5.5) 
The flow share of a given service is the ratio of its attractive capacity to the overall attractive 
capacity of the line bundle. Assuming saturated capacities i.e. Zakk ana ∈∀=/ , then 
 
∑ ∈
=η
Zz zz
aa
a kf
kf
, (5.6) 
i.e. a ratio of supplied capacity which no longer depends on n . 
Formulae (5.5) and (5.6) may be compared to that of the uncapacitated model, 
∑ ∈= Az zaa ffp / . In the capacitated model, line frequency is multiplied by vehicle attractive 
capacity prior to line combination. Thus the competition of service options is summarized by 
the main state variable, n , which itself would stem from the travel time relationship between 
zθ  as ZT  and an exogenous traffic load q  as ZH x. . 
5.4 Continuous approximation for travel time and wait time 
So far we have used recursive formulae for travel time and wait time. Let us search for some 
more straightforward formulas by setting ad hoc assumptions. 
Under MW let us assume that attractive bundles do not depend on stock size i.e. 0=zN  
Zz ∈∀  so that ZB = . Then, letting +−−≡′ )( aaa knkk , 
])([1 ∑ ∈
−
+ θ−+′
+α=θ Ba
knaaa
a
B
n
n
kntkff
a
, 
So that, letting Baa fff /≡′  and ∑ ∈ ′′≡′′ Ba aaaB tkftkf )..( , 
B
B
Ba knaan tkff
nknfn
a
)..()( ′′+α=θ−′−θ ∑ ∈ −+ . 
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Now, neglecting the potential discrepancy between +− )( akn  and )( akn −  on one hand and 
between ak  and ak′  on the other, let us search for a quadratic expression 
2nn γ+β+ξ  of nnθ : 
it must hold that 
B
B
Ba aaa tkff
nknknfnn )..(])()([ 22 ′+α=−γ+−β+ξ′−γ+β+ξ ∑ ∈ , 
which yields that 
Bkf ).(
1
2
α
=γ , 
B
B
B
B
kf
tkf
kf
kf
).(
)..(
).(
).(
2 2
2
+
α
=β . 
Denoting BB kf ).(≡κ  and Baaa kf κ≡η / , then 
 BB
B
n tkn ).(]).([2
MW pi+η+
κ
α
≈θ . (5.7) 
The approximate average wait time stems from (5.7) after replacing at  by 0  and reducing 
generalized time into physical time through division by α , yielding that 
 ]).([
2
1MW
B
B
n knw η+
κ
≈ . (5.8) 
Under priority queuing, consider ∑
=
≡
n
i
in gG 1
)()(
 and make the same ad hoc assumptions that 
0=aN  and ZB = : then 
][.
]1[.
)(
1
)()( /
∑
∑ ∑
∈
−
∈ +=
−
−
−
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This formula can be identified with that for )(MW
nθ , yielding the approximation  
 
2)( nnG n γ+β= . (5.9) 
As )1()()( −−= nnn GGg , the last formula leads to 
 
B
B
BB
B
B
n
kf
tkf
kfkf
kf
n
kfg ).(
)..(]).(
1
).(
).([
2).( 2
2)(
PQ +−
α
+
α
= . (5.10) 
The average wait time is derived from that by replacing at  with zero and dividing by α , 
yielding 
 ]).(
1
).(
).([
2
1
2
2
PQ
BB
B
B
n kfkf
kfn
w −+
κ
≈ . (5.11) 
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As in the binary instance addressed in Section 2, it is found here that mingled passengers 
estimate half the wait time that would be estimated by a passenger queued with rank equal to 
the stock size. 
The replacement of +− )( akn  by )( akn −  makes the formulas crude approximations. Little’s 
law enables us to equate two statements of the total wait time experienced during a reference 
period H : first, that spent on platform i.e. nH . , second, that wait time spent by the exited 
customers i.e. wH B ..κ : so a more robust estimation would be 
 B
n nw κ≈ /)( , (5.12) 
which is based only on the assumption (approximation) that n  remains about constant. Up to 
a constant term that would vanish should all vehicles have the same capacity, (5.11) and 
(5.12) are identical, whereas (5.8) under MW differs from them by a halving factor that could 
be interpreted as some optimism bias among mingled passengers. 
However, as coefficient α  depicts the discomfort of wait relative to in-vehicle time, another 
interpretation could be to distinguish MWα  from PQα . Then, setting PQ2
1
MW α=α  would 
make the approximation formulae identical, meaning that exogenous conditions ),( θq  would 
yield an identical stock size whatever the waiting discipline. In an application there is no prior 
expectation that MWn  and PQn  would be identical in response to factors ),( θq , so factors α  
should be calibrated to the case on the basis of data about not only time and flow but also 
stock size. Indeed, stock size also determines platform crowding and some specific 
phenomena such as the discomfort of waiting there and the processes of alighting from and 
boarding in the service vehicles. 
5.5 Comparison to previous transit assignment models 
Three main approaches have been taken to model vehicle capacity in transit assignment, 
namely Effective frequency, Failure to board and User preference set. 
In the effective frequency model (De Cea and Fernandez, 1993, Cominetti and Correa, 2001, 
Cepeda et al, 2006), at any station along a transit line the line wait time increases with respect 
to the passenger through flow, the alighting flow and the boarding flow on the basis of a 
function that is a mathematical artefact; then the line frequency is derived from the wait time 
to be combined at that station in the classical way. This model represents neither stock size 
nor waiting discipline; the evaluation of wait time and line flow share is artificial. 
In the Failure-to-board model (Kurauchi et al, 2003, Shimamoto et al, 2005), stock size is not 
represented explicitly but the waiting discipline is considered. Under MW the wait time stems 
from the probability of failure to board in a given vehicle, based on the residual capacity and 
the number of candidate riders. The attractivity of a line is determined by the sum of its 
expected wait time (by taking into account the random number of vehicle arrivals until 
success to board) and travel time. The flow share between attractive lines stems from their 
nominal frequency, before the boarding flow is truncated at the line residual capacity. 
In the User-preference-set model (Hamdouch et al, 2004), passengers wait in a queue to board 
in a line vehicle or divert to another line. The wait time is not identified within the travel time: 
for this reason attractivity is defined in a specific way, based on an ordered list of ‘travel links 
from current node’, called the user preference set at the station node. Only the entry passenger 
flow is considered – not the stock size. The share of flow between alternative attractive lines 
is proportional to their supplied capacity. 
Leurent F  Capacitated traffic equilibrium 
DRAFT 24/33 June 2011 
More information about these models is provided by Leurent and Askoura (2010). It seems 
that our model of Passenger Stock and Attractivity Threshold (PSAT) addresses explicitly the 
widest set of features among the static models of transit assignment, within its own outreach. 
6. Markovian model 
Let us now state the PSAT model in the framework of queuing theory. Indeed, the passengers 
that arrive at the station platform make up a flow of customer with arrival rate λ , whereas 
service is delivered along transit lines of given capacity ak  that arrive at rate af . The state 
variable is the number of customers waiting in station, n . In the ‘bulk service’ model of 
queuing theory (e.g. Kleinrock, 1975) it is assumed that all capacity available in a vehicle will 
be attractive to any passenger waiting at the station: this is the PSAT model with null 
thresholds. Here the general PSAT model is cast into a Markovian framework: the waiting 
discipline is embedded through the threshold values, which stem from microeconomic 
behaviours as stated previously. 
Two previous works on transit assignment are noteworthy in this context. Firstly, Chriqui and 
Robillard (1975) addressed the uncapacitated problem in which only attractive lines are used 
and their service by a vehicle empties the passenger stock whatever its size. Then the resulting 
stock model is very simple: the stationary probability is distributed Poisson with parameter 
the combined frequency of attractive lines. Secondly, Cominetti and Correa (2001) stated the 
transition equations for a bulk model restricted to attractive lines: but they did not identify 
attractivity thresholds. 
Here the PSAT model is expressed as a state-transition model (§ 6.1). Then stochastic 
equilibrium is formulated, with explicit solution for binary models with two lines of vehicle 
capacity unity or infinity (§ 6.2). Macroscopic properties are derived for stock size, yielding 
the average wait time, the line flows and the travel time (§ 6.3). Lastly, some numerical 
illustration is provided (§ 6.4). 
6.1 State-transition model 
Assume that (i) the process of customer arrivals is Markov with rate λ , (ii) each transit line is 
serviced by a process of vehicle arrivals that is Markov with rate af  and (iii) all processes are 
independent. Then the station as a queuing system has one state variable only, the size of the 
passenger stock denoted here as X . At a given instant h , the state variable has a given value 
nhX =)(  that is a nonnegative integer. Each such value n  is a system state, from which a 
transition may occur as follows: 
- To state 1+n  with rate λ , meaning the arrival of one more customer. 
- For each line Za ∈ , to state nakn /−  with rate af  meaning the arrival of a service 
vehicle that is used by a number nak /  of customers. 
Any other transition between distinct states has null rate. So the Markov chain has the 
following infinitesimal generator ]0,:[
,
≥= mnq mnQ  : 
λ=+1,nnq   (6.1a) 
0
,
=+mnnq  for 1>m   (6.1b) 
∑
−=∈= inkZa ain na fq /:,  for ni <   (6.1c) 
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∑
−=∈−λ−= inkZa ann na fq /:,  for 0>n .  (6.1d) 
Fig. 1 (resp. 2) depicts the state-transition graph of two lines a  and b  with 0=aN  and 
0>≡ν bN  with )1,1(),( =ba kk  (resp. ),1(),( ∞=ba kk ). 
 
Fig. 1. State-transition graph of binary model with )1,1(),( =ba kk . 
 
Fig. 2. State-transition graph of binary model with ),1(),( ∞=ba kk . 
 
6.2 Stochastic equilibrium 
The system is in stochastic equilibrium (i.e. under stationary regime) if at any instant the 
probability of being in a given state stems from the stationary distribution 0][ ≥pi= nnπ  that 
satisfies the conservation (or balance) of probability flow for each state. In other words, for 
each system state the exports and imports of probability flow are balanced: 
 ∑∑ ≠≠ pi=pi nm nmmnm mnn qq ,, . (6.2) 
Owing to the definition of nnq , this amounts to 
 0
,
=pi∑m nmmq .  
In matrix form, denoting by 0]1[ ≥= n1 , the conservation equation that defines the stationary 
distribution of probability is: 
 0. =Qπ , subject to 0π ≥  and 1. =1π . (6.3) 
For the PSAT model, denoting }:{)( / nkmmmK mbb =−= , at order n  the conservation 
equation is: 
 ∑ ∑∑
≤ ∈
−
<
pi+λpi=+λpi
nNb nKm
mbn
nNb
bn
b bb
ff
: )(
1
:
)()( , (6.4) 
Condition { nNb < } is required to go out of state n  using line b . Condition { nNb ≤ } stems 
from the requirement of ∅≠)(nKb  to come in state n  from m  such that nkm mb =− / , 
which can hold only if 1+≥ bNm  hence bNn ≥ . 
λ
0 1 n n+1 n-1 ν
 
+1 ν 
λ λ λλ λ λ
fa fa 
λ
fa fa fa fa fa 
fb  for each dotted transition 
fa 
λ
0 1 n n+1 n-1 ν
 
+1 ν 
λ λ λλ λ λλ
fa fa 
fa+fb 
fa 
fa+fb fa+fb fa+fb fa+fb fa+fb 
Leurent F  Capacitated traffic equilibrium 
DRAFT 26/33 June 2011 
Let us multiply in a formal way each side of eqn. (6.4) by nζ  and sum over n . Then 
stochastic equilibrium amounts to the equality of two formal series: 
 ∑ ∑∑∑ ∑
>
−
<
ζpi+ζpiζ
λ
=ζ+λpi
b Nm
km
mbn
n
nn
n
nNb
bn
b
mb
b
ff /)()(
:
. (6.5) 
This equation involves the generating function of distribution pi , ∑ ζpi≡ζ n nn)(*N . The 
transformation of the matrix conservation equation into the functional equation is useful if the 
functional equation admits a simple solution )(*N ζ . This holds notably when the transitions 
occur between neighbouring states and have homogeneous transition rates. 
Instance 1 (continued). For the binary 1/1 model, any state ν>n  is attained from 1−n  with 
rate λ  or 1+n  with rate baZ fff +≡  since both lines contribute to that transition; it is left 
towards 1+n  at rate λ  or towards 1−n  at rate Zf .The balance equation is: 
 ZnnZn ff 11)( +− pi+λpi=+λpi . (6.6a) 
State ν=n  exports to 1+ν  at rate λ  and to 1−ν  at rate af ; it imports from 1−ν  at rate λ  
or 1+ν  at rate Zf , yielding: 
 Za ff 11)( +ν−νν pi+λpi=+λpi . (6.6b) 
State }1,..1{ −ν∈n  exports to 1+n  at rate λ  and to 1−n  at rate af ; it imports from 1−n  at 
rate λ  or 1+n  at rate af , yielding: 
 annan ff 11)( +− pi+λpi=+λpi . (6.6c) 
At 0=n , af10 pi=λpi . (6.6d) 
It is shown in the Appendix that 
ν≤∀n , ν−ν piϕ=pi nn , (6.7a) 
0≥∀m , ν+ν piρ=pi mm , (6.7b) 
wherein Zf/λ≡ρ  and λ≡ϕ /af . This yields that: 
 
1]
1
1
1
1[ −
ν
ν ρ−
+
ϕ−
ϕ−ϕ=pi , (6.8a) 
 }
1
{)(*N ζρ−
ζ
+ζ−ϕ
ζ−ϕϕpi=ζ
ννν
ν . (6.8b) 
Instance 2 (continued). In the binary ∞/1  model, any state ν>n  exports to 1+n  at rate λ  
and to 1−n  at rate af  and to ν  at rate bf ; it imports from 1−n  at rate λ  or 1+n  at rate af , 
yielding: 
 annZn ff 11)( +− pi+λpi=+λpi . (6.9a) 
Any state },..1{ ν∈n  behaves as a state }1,..1{ −ν∈n  in the 1/1 model, cf. (6.6c). State 0 still 
obeys to (6.6d). The formulae for the stationary probabilities, νpi  and )(*N ζ  are identical to 
those in the 1/1 model except for a specific definition of ρ  (as the solution of 
Za ff +ρ=ρλ+ρ / , cf. Appendix). 
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In both binary models, (6.7) implies that bN=ν  is the mode of the stationary distribution. 
6.3 Macroscopic properties 
The generating function is endowed with some important properties, among which that 
10 )(*Nd
d]E[
=ζ≥ ζζ=pi= ∑n nnX , 
12
2
0 )(*Nd
d)1()]1(E[
=ζ≥ ζζ=pi−=− ∑n nnnXX . 
Combining the two formulae yields the variance 22 ])(E[]E[]V[ XXX −= . 
By Little’s law, the average number of customers in the station is equal to the average 
individual wait time multiplied by the flow rate of customers: λ= /]E[XwZ . 
Binary model. The formula for ]E[X  is established in the appendix: 
 ]
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(1[]E[ 22 ρ−
ρ+ρ−ν
+
ϕ−
ϕ−ν+−ϕϕpi=
ν
νX . (6.10a) 
So ]
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(1[ 22 ρ−
ρ+ρ−ν
+
ϕ−
ϕ−ν+−ϕϕ
λ
pi
=
ν
ν
Zw . (6.10b) 
When ϕ  is small enough and ν  is large enough, the average stock size tends to the 
attractivity threshold which is the mode of the stationary distribution: 
ν≈
ρ−
+
ϕ−
ϕ
νpi≈ ν ]1
1
1
[]E[X . 
Conditional on state n , a vehicle of line z  that arrives gets a passenger load of nzk / . The  
line has passenger flow averaged over time instants (hence the stationary distribution): 
∑ pi= n nnzzz kfx / . 
Instance 1 (continued). In the 1/1 binary model, 
 )1()1( 01 νν≥ ϕpi−=pi−=pi= ∑ aan naa fffx , (6.11a) 
 
1)1( −νν> ρ−ρpi=pi= ∑ bn nbb ffx . (6.11b) 
Instance 2 (continued). In the ∞/1  binary model, ax  is same as in (6.11a) whereas 
 
2
1/ )1( −ν≥νν> ρ−ρpi=ρpi=pi= ∑∑ bm mbn nbnbb fmfkfx . (6.12) 
In both instances, letting 0=ε  under 1/1 or 1=ε  under ∞/1 , the ratio of line flow between 
the two lines is: 
 ]
1
111[)1(]1[)1(
1
ϕ−
ϕ−
ρ
ρ−
+ρ−=ϕ−
piρ
ρ−
=
ν
εν−
ν
ε+
b
a
b
a
b
a
f
f
f
f
x
x
. (6.13) 
As ϕ  and ρ  depend of af , bf  and λ  the ratio of line flow cannot be equal to that of line 
frequency except on some special circumstance such as 0=ν  under 1/1. 
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Lastly, the average run time and travel time are, respectively: 
 ∑
∈λ
=
Zb
bbZ txt
1
, (6.14) 
 ZZZ wtg α+= . (6.15) 
In the binary instances, 
 ])1()1([1 1 ε−−ννν ρ−ρpi+ϕpi−λ= bbaaZ ftftt , (6.16) 
 







ρ−ρpi+ϕpi−+
ρ−
ρ+ρ−ν
+
ϕ−
ϕ−ν+−ϕϕαpi
λ
=
ε−−
ν
ν
ν
ν
ν
1
22 )1()1(])1(
)1(
)1(
)1(1[1 bbaaZ ftftg . (6.17) 
6.4 Numerical illustration 
Let us come back to instance 1 as dealt with in Section 2. Recall that == ba ff  10/h. 
Fig. 3 depicts the variation of ax  with λ  ranging from 0 to =Zf  20/h, for two values 3=ν  
and 5=ν  that correspond to Priority Queuing and Mingled Waiting, respectively. Fig. 4 
(resp. 5) depicts the variation of line flow ratio ba xx /  (resp. Zg ) with respect to λ  in both 
cases. 
It comes out that the average travel time increases more than linearly with demand volume λ : 
when λ  reaches 19 i.e. 95% of the supplied capacity, the travel time is more than four times 
that in the absence of congestion. The faster line, a , accommodates most of the demand at the 
low volumes (Fig. 4). The flow share of the other line reaches ½ when demand approaches 
capacity, in accordance with the share of supplied capacity. MW is more conservative than 
PQ towards the faster line: this could be expected from Section 2. 
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Fig. 3. Variation of ax  with λ  under PQ ( 3=ν ) and MW ( 5=ν ). 
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Fig. 4. Variation of ba xx /  with λ  under PQ ( 3=ν ) and MW ( 5=ν ). 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Lambda
A
v
er
ag
e 
Tr
a
v
e
l C
o
s
t gZ_pq
gZ_mw
 
Fig. 5. Variation of Zg  with λ  under PQ ( 3=ν ) and MW ( 5=ν ). 
 
7. Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
At a station platform, the waiting time for a passenger to board in a transit vehicle depends on 
not only the line frequency and capacity by vehicle but also the stock of passengers and their 
waiting discipline. These influence also route choice when there are several alternatives. A 
theory has been provided to represent passenger waiting and stock on platform together with 
line attractivity. Based on the characteristics of the line set, there is a maximal stock size up to 
which a given line is unattractive: this is the line attractivity threshold. When the stock 
exceeds the threshold, then the attractive capacity of a vehicle is the minimum of the supplied 
capacity and the rest of stock size minus threshold. Two waiting disciplines have been 
considered, priority queuing where better ranked passengers have better access versus 
mingled waiting; individual behaviour has been assumed under both disciplines – it turns out 
that priority queuing is more advantageous to the passengers as it yields system optimization 
beyond user equilibrium. 
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Composition rules have been provided to represent the evaluation of route options conditional 
on stock size by the individual passenger, yielding the average travel time of a line bundle. 
Conditions for line attractivity and for user equilibrium have been stated; the existence and 
uniqueness of an attractive line bundle which yields user equilibrium have been demonstrated, 
on the basis of a recursive structure of the attractive set at a given stock size. 
The resulting model is basically stationary: it involves three traffic variables namely stock 
size, travel time of line bundle and exit flow. So it amounts to a fundamental traffic diagram 
for a line bundle: the consequences for transit assignment have been explored. Lastly, a 
Markovian model has been developed to characterize the stationary state of the system under 
a given flow of customer arrivals: analytical solutions have been provided for binary models 
where lines have unit or infinite vehicle capacity. 
7.2 Research perspectives 
The scope of the model is limited to one destination, homogeneous passengers and a station 
platform organized into one boarding zone only (Leurent, 2009a). Specific work has been 
invested by the author and co-workers to extend the model to continuous variables (Leurent, 
2010b), more sophisticated station layout (Chandakas and Leurent, 2010), several destinations 
(Leurent et al, 2011). 
Further research could be aimed at a dynamic version in which the passenger stock would 
vary over time; at the development of robust behavioural rules about the evaluation of line 
characteristics by the individual passenger; at the inclusion of stochastic features such as 
variations in vehicle capacity among the runs that service a route, or clustered arrivals of 
passengers – e.g. at a transfer station. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1 PQ as System optimization for MW 
Let us show that the marginal overall travel time under MW mingled waiting is identical to 
the individual travel time under PQ for the last passenger in the stock by finishing the 
demonstration in Section 2.5.  
If a line a  not in )1( −nA  is included in )(nA  by comparison to a criterion (2.34) that is 
based on previous determinations, the criterion is the same for both PQ and MW social. The 
added line turns )(MW
ngn  into  
)(
MW
)(
)()1(
MW
)(
)(
MW ))1((~ n
anA
nAn
a
anA
an gnf
f
gntf
fgn
+
−
+
+−+=  
By convex combination, the )1(MW)1( −− ngn  part within )(MWngn  is maintained. Thus 
)(
PQ
)(
)(
)(
)1(
MW
)(
MW )1(~ n
anA
nA
a
anA
ann gf
f
tf
fgngn
++
− +=−− . 
On the other side, under PQ,  )(PQ
)(
)(
)(
)(
PQ
~ n
anA
nA
a
anA
an gf
f
tf
fg
++
+= . 
Thus )(PQ
)1(
MW
)(
MW
~)1(~ nnn ggngn =−− −  and the equivalency between the two routing behaviours is 
maintained by the inclusion of another line as well as by order incrementation. 
9.2 Inductive solution of binary Markovian model 
Let us search for a geometric solution: 
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 v
m
m piρ=pi +ν , 0≥m . (9.1)  
Under 1/1, (6.6a) at 1++ν m  requires that ZZ ff 2)( ρ+λ=+λρ  i.e. λ−ρ=ρ−ρ )1()( 2 Zf  or 
Zf/λ=ρ  which must be less than 1 to preserve stationarity (demand λ  less than supplied 
capacity Zf ). 
Under ∞/1 , (6.9a) at 1++ν m  requires that aZ ff 2)( ρ+λ=+λρ . The discriminant of this 
second order equation is bZaZ ffff λ+−λ=λ−+λ=∆ 4)(4)( 22  which is 0≥ . Solution has 
the form ][* 2
1 ∆η++λ=ρ Zf fa  with }1,1{ +−∈η  : only the positive value 1+  is likely for 
η . 
Whatever the waiting discipline, for ν<< n0 , (6.6c) is equivalent to 
 )()( 11 +− pi−pi=λpi−pi nnann f . (9.2)  
Let nnn pi−pi≡δ −1  and λ≡ϕ /af . Then (9.2) implies that 
 ν
−ν δϕ=δ nn , (9.3a)  
 
ϕ−
ϕ−δ+pi=pi
−ν
νν 1
1 n
n , (9.3b)  
since ∑∑∑∑ −−ν
=νν
ν
+=
−ν
νν
ν
+=νν
−ν
= + ϕδ+pi=ϕδ+pi=δ+pi=pi+pi−pi=pi
1
011
1
1)( ni ini ini ini iin . 
Under 1/1, (6.6b) at ν=n  yields that ν−ν ϕpi=pi 1  hence )1( −ϕpi=δ νν  so 
 
n
n
−ν
νϕpi=pi  for ν≤n . (9.4)  
Similarly, under ∞/1  eqn. (6.6c) applied to ν=n  implies that Za ff ρpi+λpi=+λpi ν−νν 1)(  
hence ν−ν ϕpi=pi 1  yielding also (9.4). 
Lastly, the value of νpi  stems from the law of total probability: 
]
11
1[][1 1
1
100 ρ−
ρ
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ν . (9.5)  
9.3 Generating function 
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Thus 
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From this stems: 
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By letting ζ  tend to 1, we obtain that 
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)1(
)1(
)1(
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ν
νX . (9.8)  
When ϕ  is small enough and ν  is large enough, approximately 
ν≈
ρ−
+
ϕ−
ϕ
νpi≈ ν ]1
1
1
[]E[X . 
Thus the average stock size tends to the mode of the stationary distribution. 
9.4 Line flow of second line 
Under 1/1, 1/ =nbk  if ν>n  or zero otherwise so 
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Under ∞/1 , +ν−= )(/ nk nb  so 
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